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California Corporate Securities Law:
Small Business Capital Formation
and Investor Protection
Small business, I through the drive, creativity, and spirit of individual
entrepreneurs, is the essence of our free enterprise system.2 Small busi-
ness accounts for more than 96 percent of all businesses, more than 50
percent of all scientific and technological development, 55 percent of
all private employment, and 48 percent of all national output?
The economic growth of small business has been slowed by a combi-
nation of inflation, tight credit, and a decline in the amount of avail-
able equity financing.4 Institutions have been reluctant to invest in
small business,5 and the stock market as a whole has experienced a
flight of individual investors.6 Thus, presently there exists a need to
enhance capital formation.7
Small business capital formation often is best achieved through the
issuance of equity securities since periodic interest payments are not
required and the risk of failure is shared with outside investors.8 In-
creased access to the securities market through liberalization of securi-
ties regulation is thought by many to be an appropriate method for
1. A small business, as defined by the U.S. Small Business Administration, has assets not
exceeding $9 million, a net worth of less than $4 million, and an average annual net income of not
more than $400,000. Small Business Financing-The Current Environment and Suggestions for Im-
pro vement, reprinted in Hearings on Various Tax Proposals Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and
Debt Management Generally ofthe Senate Comm. on Finance, 96 Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 277 (1980)
(special report published by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
2. Hearings, supra note 1, at 277.
3. Further, small business produces as much as 24 times the amount of technological inno-
vations per research and development dollar as do larger businesses. Hearings, supra note 1, at
277.
4. Hearings, supra note 1, at 271-72.
5. Survey results that included responses from bank trust departments, insurance compa-
nies, investment companies, mutual funds, and college endowment funds indicate that the most
prominent reason for the disinclination to invest in small business is illiquidity of investment.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 283-86.
6. Hearings, supra note 1, at 273. For most small businesses, loans from banks, insurance
companies, and even the Small Business Administration are either inadequate or unavailable. J.
MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BUSINESS PROMOTIONs, 43 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as MOFSKY].
7. Capital formation, for purposes of this comment, refers to the financing of business oper-
ations via the issuance of equity or long-term debt securities. For a discussioon of the capital
formation problems of small business see Hearings, supra note 1, at 271-74.
8. See MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 19-20.
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enhancing capital formation.' Recent modificiation of the California
Corporate Securities Law'" (hereinafter referred to as CSL) reflects this
view. ' I
The current CSL was enacted in 1968, superseding its 1917 predeces-
sor.' The CSL established a merit-based system of securities regula-
tion by authorizing the Commissioner of Corporations (hereinafter
referred to as Commissioner) to deny qualification of the sale of any
security unless: the plan of business and terms of the issuance are "fair,
just, and equitable," the applicant intends to transact business fairly
and honestly, and the sale will not work a fraud on the purchasers.' 3
Because every nonexempt securities transaction must be qualified by
the Department of Corporations (hereinafter referred to as Depart-
ment), this fairness standard must be met before the offer or sale of a
security within California is legitimate.14
To further the goal of "fairness" in securities transactions, qualifica-
tion requires nine areas of departmental inquiry: (1) practicability of
the proposed plan of business,' 5 (2) honesty, competency, and experi-
ence of management,' 6 (3) plan of financing and adequacy of capitali-
zation,' 7 (4) fairness of the terms of the offer to both proposed and
existing shareholders,'" (5) fairness of selling expenses,' 9 (6) fairness of
the amount of shares given for promotional consideration,20 (7) fairness
of the offering price,2' (8) financial condition of the corporation,22 and
(9) disclosure of material facts surrounding the offering. 23 When any of
these inquiries reveals that an aspect of a securities transaction is un-
fair, the Department communicates its objection to the issuer2 4 in a
9. Hearings, supra note 1, at 274. See generally MOFSKY, supra note 6; SECURITIES REGU-
LATORY REFORM PANEL, BUSINESS, TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING AGENCY, SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS 7-13 (Feb. 11, 1981).
10. CAL. CORP. CODE §§25000-31316.
11. California Corporations Code Section 25102(1) as amended grants small issuers greater
access to securities markets. See notes 147, 148 and accompanying text infra.
12. 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS §1.01
(1980) [hereinafter cited as MARSH & VOLK].
13. CAL. CORP. CODE §25140(b).
14. It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security unless it is exempted or is quali-
fied by the Department. Id §25110.
15. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §8.141].
16. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §8.14[2].
17. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §8.14[3].
18. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §§8.02[3]-8.03[5].
19. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.20.
20. Id §§260.140.30-260.140.33.
21. Id §260.140.50; CAL. CORP. CODE §25140(d).
22. See 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§260.001(f) (consideration of profit to determine if corpora-
tion is seasoned); 260.140.05 (use of profit-making objectives to determine if the business is specu-
lative); 260.613 (requirement of financial statements).
23. Id §260.113; CAL. CORP. CODE §25401.
24. Issuer means "any person who issues or proposes to issue any security." Id §25010. For
purposes of this comment, the terms issuer and offeror are used interchangeably.
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deficiency letter.25 The issuer then may remedy the deficiency and
bring the offering up to standard by filing an amendment with the De-
partment. 6 Thus, the CSL not only provides for a review procedure,
but also protects investors by withholding the right to issue securities,
until any deficiency or question of fairness raised by the Department is
cured by the issuer.
The investor protection provided by the departmental inquiries into
fairness27 must be considered for an accurate evaluation of an exemp-
tion to qualification. 28 The need to enhance capital formation through
reform of state blue sky laws29 has been widely discussed. 30 Legislation
adding a new exemption to the CSL qualification requirements ad-
dresses this concern for reform by wholly exempting from qualification
issuer transactions to certain types of individual investors.3'
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the current CSL and the
new exemption and to propose a modification of this exemption to pro-
vide for disclosure of information to the investor. The CSL and its
exemptive provisions will be analyzed in light of the twin goals of in-
vestor protection and small business capital formation. This analysis,
although restricted to offerings by corporate entities, 32 will extend to
both open and limited offering qualification procedures. An examina-
tion of the newly adopted exemption will reveal that investor protec-
tion is not adequately safeguarded because this exemption makes no
provision for disclosure of information necessary for an informed in-
vestment decision. Consequently, this comment will propose that the
exemption include a provision for disclosure of information by the is-
suer to any investor who is not an officer, director, or controlling person
of the issuer. The goal of this proposal is to provide a substitute for the
Department's inquiries into fairness, yet provide greater flexibility to
25. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §2.02[4].
26. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §2.02[4].
27. See notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
28. A rough analogy to federal law is applicable here. In Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Y. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953), the Court held that the federal exemption for
nonpublic offerings must provide "the protections afforded by registration." Thus, an exemption
from the CSL qualification requirements should provide a substitute for the Department's inquir-
ies into fairness.
29. The term blue sky law is a popular metonymy used to describe state laws, such as the
CSL, which are intended to prevent sales of securities that are tantamount to sales of building lots
in the blue sky in fee simple. MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 10.
30. See note 9 supra.
31. The exemption amends Section 25102(0 of the California Corporations Code. Section
25102 only exempts issuer transactions from qualification. CAL_ COPP. CODE §25102. Nonissuer
transactions must either be exempt under California Corporations Code Section 25102 or be qual-
ified. Id §25130. A nonissuer transaction is defined as "any transaction not directly or indirectly
for the benefit of the issuer." Id §25011. By implication, an issuer transaction is for the benefit of
the issuer. This comment is limited to a discussion of issuer transactions.
32. The California Corporate Securities Law, however, applies to any security. See id
§25110. For the definition of a security see California Corporations Code Section 25019.
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small corporate offerings than is allowed under the qualification re-
quirements. Disclosure is also intended to promote accurate and com-
plete financial record-keeping. Before discussing the proposal,
however, a thorough appraisal of the qualification tnd exemption pro-
visions of the CSL and their impact on small corporate issuers and of-
ferees is needed to understand why reform is called for in this area.
CONFORMING A SECURITIES ISSUANCE WITH THE CSL
The small businessperson desiring to sell securities in California
must either find an exemption to qualification or qualify the securi-
ties." Qualification under the CSL can be for an open offering or a
limited offering.34 A limited offering qualification is one which "autho-
rizes the offer and sale of securities only to persons designated therein
by name or class."35 An open qualification "authorizes the offer and
sale of securities to the public generally, without restriction as to per-
sons or class of persons."36
The purpose of distinguishing limited from open offerings is to allow
review to be made in light of the sophistication and financial condition
of the proposed offerees.37 Thus, certain departmental objections that
preclude a finding of fairness for offerings to the public at large may be
waived when the offering is restricted to certain offerees. 38
A. Qualfying an Open Offering
Because an open qualification allows for unrestricted offers and sales
of securities, the issuer will not be allowed the variation from the stan-
dards of fairness which might be allowed in a limited offering qualifica-
tion.39 A small corporate issuer should not seek an open qualification
when the promoter 4° or controlling shareholder desires to use one or
more control devices to retain a contemplated percentage of voting
shares or when the business is considered speculative.
33. Seeid §25110.
34. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140. This comment will only address permit qualification-a
procedure that can be used to qualify any security. CAL. CoRP. CODE §25113. The two other
procedures, qualification by coordination and qualification by notification, do not apply to small
issuers. Coordination applies only to securities for which a registration statement has been filed
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Id §25111. Notification applies only to issuers of securi-
ties registered either under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940. Id §25112.
35. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.001(e).
36. Id §260.001(d).
37. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §6.05[3][c].
38. See 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.
39. See id The Commissioner's rules governing the fairness of an offering are contained in
Title 10 of California Administrative Code Section 260.140-260.140.139.
40. The terms "promoter" and "entrepreneur" are used interchangeably in this comment.
They both refer to the organizer of an economic venture.
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1. Control Devices
An entrepreneur who lacks sufficient personal resources to finance a
venture will attempt to obtain capital from others.4' Control may be
retained by the entrepreneur in a securities offering if one or more con-
trol devices are used.42 These devices are issuance of promotional
shares, issuance of nonvoting securities, and imposition of transfer re-
strictions on the shares issued. The fairness standards adopted by the
Commissioner, however, limit the use of these control devices.43
Promotional shares are those securities which are issued in consider-
ation for: (1) services rendered in connection with founding or organiz-
ing the business, (2) property to the extent its value is unsatisfactorily
established, or (3) a price lower than the amount others must pay for
the security.44 The two principal restrictions on promotional shares are
amount limitations and transfer restrictions.
The amount of promotional shares that may be issued by an unsea-
soned corporation45 is 25 percent of all common shares.46 A seasoned
corporation47 cannot issue promotional shares except in unusual cir-
cumstances. 48 Thus, control cannot be obtained by a promoter through
the use of promotional shares alone.49 Limiting the amount of promo-
tional shares that can be issued, however, protects investors by limiting
the dilutive effect these shares have on the investment of others. °
Promotional shares also must carry transfer restrictions.5 1 These re-
strictions are not removable until an earnings record, satisfactory to the
Department, has been achieved for at least three years.5 2 The restric-
tions on transfer of promotional shares are designed to protect investors
by preventing promoters from selling these shares soon after comple-
41. See MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 19-20.
42. See MoFsKy, supra note 6, at 41-54.
43. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text infra. Authority to promulgate regulations in
furtherance of the fair, just, and equitable standard is given to the Commissioner in Sections
25140 and 25610 of the California Corporations Code.
44. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.30.
45. A seasoned corporation is one "which has been conducting bona fide business operations,
either directly or through a predecessor, for more than two years, and has operated at a profit
during at least one of the last three fiscal years." Id §260.001(f). Thus, an unseasoned corpora-
tion is one which has not met this criteria.
46. The issuance of 25% or less promotional shares by an unseasoned corporation is pre-
sumptively reasonable. Id §260.140.31.
47. See note 45 supra.
48. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.31; MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §8.05[4].
49. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §9.02[3][a].
50. The dilutive effect of promotional shares is noted in MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12,
§9.02[4][a].
51. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.141.1.
52. Satisfactory earnings are described as "a reasonable return for the particular type of busi-
ness on an amount determined by multiplying the total number of outstanding shares of the issuer
by the average price at which the nonpromotional shares were originally issued and sold." Ad
§260.141.2.
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tion of the public offering.5 3 The prevention of these promoter "bail-
outs" appears to be based on the assumption that another person actu-
ally will buy diluted shares having little or no dividend yield.54 Trans-
fer restrictions preclude sales prior to the achievement of a sufficient
earnings record. Notwithstanding, such sales may be justified when
made to incoming professional management 55 or to pay the tax due on
the bargain purchase of the promotional shares. 6
In sum, the Department protects investors by preventing excessive
dilution caused by the issuance of promotional shares and by prevent-
ing sale of promotional shares until the Department is satisfied with the
corporation's earnings. Consequently, use of promotional shares alone
does not assure the entrepreneur of retaining a controlling interest and
does not appeal to entrepreneurs who anticipate a need to liquidate
some or all of their investment in their shares.
Another method of issuing securities, without the resulting dilution
of control, is the issuance of nonvoting securities.57 Examples of these
nonvoting securities are nonvoting common stock, preferred stock, and
debt securities. Because nonvoting common stock is only deemed fair
by the Department when issued for estate planning purposes in small,
family-owned corporations, its proposed issuance will prevent open
qualification.58 The Department usually finds unfair the issuance of
preferred shares or unsecured debt securities by a corporation lacking a
significant earnings history. 9 The ability of a corporation lacking a
significant earnings history to make dividend or interest payments is
speculative; hence, the grant of a dividend preference or the promise to
pay interest can be grounded only on the conjecture of the issuer and
may be misleading to the investor.60 Thus, for many entrepreneurs
seeking open qualification, the retention of control through the issu-
ance of nonvoting securities is impossible.
Nevertheless, even when initial control is obtained, subsequent sales
by investors to outsiders cannot be prevented by issuer-imposed trans-
fer restrictions. A corporate issuer seeking open qualification cannot
53. MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 35.
54. MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 34, 35.
55. It is generally acknowledged that entrepreneurs tend to be dysfunctional as managers
during later stages of corporate growth. See Charan, Hofer & Mahon, From Entrepreneurial to
Professional Management: At Set of Guidelines, 18 J. SMALL Bus. MANAGEMENT 1 (1980).
56. See TREAS. REG. §1.61-2(d)(1) (1957).
57. See MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 52.
58. See Applications for Qualification of Securities by Permit, Department of Corporations,
Sacramento, California [hereinafter cited as Applications] (copy on file at Pacjfc Law Journal).
59. Interviews with William Bickford, Senior Corporations Counsel, Department of Corpo-
rations (August 1981) [hereinafter cited as Interviews] (copy on file at Pacfc Law Journal).
60. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1.
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impose transfer restrictions on its shares.6 ' This acts to the disadvan-
tage of the entrepreneur since transfer restrictions are often essential to
the success of a business. 62 Restrictions, when found reasonable, may
prevent unwanted outsiders from gaining an interest in, or even control
of, a corporation.6 3 Therefore, an entrepreneur seeking control over
who invests in the corporation will not apply for open qualification.
Open qualification, because of its protective limitations, is undesir-
able to promoters who need outside financing without the concommi-
tant loss of control or the threat that unwanted outsiders will acquire an
interest in the business. Aside from these control considerations, the
business promotion aspect of the corporation may prevent open
qualification.
2 Speculative Business Offerings
The express statutory provisions mandating the fair, just, and equita-
ble standard do not preclude a new business' securities offerings from
open qualification. 64 When the proposed plan of business is deemed
speculative, however, an open qualification will be denied.65 Whether
a particular new business actually will be considered non-speculative is
uncertain. 6 Most small businesses, however, choose the path of lesser
resistance67 by seeking a limited offering qualification.68 This trend
may stem from a desire to retain control without use of personal funds
alone, or from a belief that the business will be found speculative, or
simply from a desire to avoid an invariable standard of fairness.
When an issuer foregoes an open qualification in favor of a limited
offering qualification, the securities cannot be offered to anyone willing
to purchase them.69 Instead, the offering must be limited to those per-
sons the Department believes can understand and withstand the risks
associated with a desired variation from a particular fairness
61. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.8.
62. Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 391 P.2d 828, 830, 38 Cal. Rptr.
348, 350 (1964).
63. Id at 287, 391 P.2d at 830, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
64. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25140.
65. A business is speculative where:
a) profits are not anticipated within a reasonable time;
b) business depends on a product or system not completed prior to the offering; or
c) preliminary profit-making objectives have not been achieved.
10 CAL. ADMiN. CODE §260.140.05.
66. This uncertainty arises when the issuer attempts to apply the test for speculativeness enu-
merated in note 65. For example, if a business is new, it would be difficult to predict whether the
Department will find that the business can produce profits within a reasonable time.
67. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
68. Out of the 19 corporations reviewed, ten chose the limited offering qualification and one
chose the open qualification. Applications, supra note 58.
69. See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
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standard.7 °
B. Qualifying a Limited Offering
A limited offering qualification is one which "authorizes the offer
and sale of securities only to persons designated therein by name or
class." 71 The purpose of distinguishing limited from open offerings is
to allow review to be made in light of the financial condition and so-
phistication of the proposed offerees. 72 This type of offering must be
used when the business is speculative or when the issuer seeks a more
liberal standard than the fairness standards applicable to open
qualifications.73
Unlike open qualifications, securities issued pursuant to a limited of-
fering qualification are required to carry transfer restrictions.74 This
restriction allows the Department to make a fairness determination in
consideration of the financial condition and sophistication of the pro-
posed transferee.75 Unfortunately, transfer restrictions make the lim-
ited offering less marketable, hence less valuable than securities of
otherwise similar quality.76
Limited offerings, like open offerings, must be qualified.77 While
limited offerings are subject to the same statutory standards of fairness
and the same nine departmental inquiries, 78 a variation from the stan-
dards imposed on open offerings sometimes may be obtained.79 The
Department makes three additional inquiries in deciding if objections,
when present, should be waived and a limited offering qualification
granted.80  These inquiries look to the type of offeree, the dollar
amount of the offering, and the sufficiency of the information provided
both to the Department and to the offeree.8
- Type of Offeree
Objections that would otherwise prevent an offering from qualifying
70. See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
71. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.001(e).
72. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §6.05[3][c].
73. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.
74. Authority to restrict transfer is given to the Commissioner in California Corporations
Code Section 25141. The purchaser of the restricted securities can obtain a consent to transfer
from the Department. CAL. COP. CODE §25151.
75. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §6.05[3][c].
76. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 573; Brooks, Small Business Financing 41ternatives Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 543, 579 (1980).
77. See CAL. CoP. CODE §25110.
78. Id §§25110, 25140(b). See notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
79. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.
80. Id
81. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1, 2.
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for issuance may be waived 2 when each of the proposed investors has
knowledge of the facts surrounding the proposed issuance8 3 and the
ability to understand the offering and its peculiar risks or defects.8 4 A
further requirement for such waiver, when the business plan involves
an unusually high degree of risk of losing a substantial sum of money,
is a showing that the proposed investors are financially able to afford
the loss.85 The prerequisites to investor suitability, such as sophistica-
tion and wealth, reduce the number of potential investors that the is-
suer seeking a limited offering qualification can attract. Because
speculative businesses can qualify only a limited offering, the number
of potential investors for these businesses is limited. Capital formation
in speculative business is impeded.
2. Insubstantial Aggregate Offering Price
A limited offering involving an insubstantial amount of money does
not justify the full statutory standard of disclosure.8 6 Consequently,
these offerings require less detail about plan of business than do offer-
ings which are open or involve a substantial offering price.8 7
Unaudited, rather than audited, financial statements also are
acceptable.88
3. Sufficiency of Information and its Disclosure
Applications for qualification must include any information the
Commissioner requires.89  The amount and type of information re-
quired by the Department will vary with the situation. For example,
when a substantial amount of money is sought, audited financial state-
ments are required. 90 Additionally, when the terms of the offer are par-
82. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.140.
83. Such facts include the proposed plan of business and the qualities of the securities which
the investor seeks to purchase. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1.
84. These investor qualifications can be made by adequately demonstrating with spec 4cfac-
tual averments that the person:
a) is an insider and participated in the formation of the plan; or,
b) is knowledgeable and negotiated the terms of the investment; or,
c) has knowledge and understanding by virtue of:
i. a preexisting relationship to the issuer, or
ii. investment or business experience, or
iii. financial background.
Interviews, supra note 59, at I.
85. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1. Substantial wealth in relation to the amount of the invest-
ment is also required when the investment is found to be illiquid. See Applications, supra note 58,
at I.
86. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1.
87. Interviews, supra note 59, at I. Since it is unclear how little "insubstantial" is, a call to
the Department before attempting to limit this disclosure is warranted.
88. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1.
89. CAL. CORP. CODE §25113.
90. Interviews, supra note 59, at 1.
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ticularly precarious, a substantial showing of sophistication is
required.9" What constitutes a showing of sophistication is uncertain
and misunderstood by many attorneys.92 For example, an averment
that the offeree was active in a industry trade association to which the
issuer belonged and that the offeree had a preexisting business and per-
sonal relationship with the offeror was found insufficient to demon-
strate sophistication.93 An amendment specifying the tenure and
nature of the offeree's actual business experience along with her famili-
arity with the business itself, including the terms of the offer, satisfied
the Department's inquiry.94
Some offerings have appeared to be so unreasonable that they com-
pletely contradict the notion that the investors are sophisticated. 95
Thus, when the Department's objections are of a sufficient magnitude,
the issuer is required to disclose certain information to the offeree.
This disclosure is usually accomplished by providing a copy of the De-
partment's "letter of transmittal" to each offeree before consideration is
accepted or shares issued.96 This disclosure specifies the effects that
certain aspects of the offering will have on the particular offeree.97 For
example, investors were told that a purchase of a minority interest in a
corporation operating at a loss, when the purchase price greatly ex-
ceeded book value, would be an illiquid investment.98 In some in-
stances, shares may be issued absent a showing of sophistication if an
"offering circular" is provided to each offeree.99 The rationale for these
two types of mandated disclosure is the Department's experience that
the terms of many limited offerings are not actually negotiated by the
parties.1°°
To summarize, the limited offering qualification procedure is a bene-
ficial departure from the mechanical application of arbitrary, mathe-
91. Examples of these objectionable terms are: obvious or gross inadequacy of capital, ab-
sence of an impounding provision, sale of promotional shares without subordination, or sale of
nonvoting common stock. Interviews, supra note 59, at 2.
92. See Applications, supra note 58, at 3, 4, 7.
93. Applications, supra note 58, at 7.
94. Applications, supra note 58, at 7.
95. Interviews, supra note 59, at 2. Two situations arose in the study of applications. In one
offering, the offeree was allegedly the company's bookkeeper and as such, was sophisticated; yet,
financial statements sent to thle Department indicated an unexplained increase in the number of
shares issued to the controlling shareholder without any additional paid-in capital shown. In
another offering when the offeree was allegedly sophisticated, the offering price was $10 per share,
but the book value per share after the proposed sale was only $0.25 per share. In this latter
instance, the company did not appear to have the kind of assets that would have a great deal of
unrealized appreciation, and the company was consistently losing money. See Applications, supra
note 58, at 4, 7.
96. Applications, supra note 58, at 7, 9.
97. Applications, supra note 58, at 7.
98. See Applications, supra note 58, at 7.
99. Interviews, supra note 59, at 3, 12.
100. Interviews, supra note 59, at 2.
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matical rules to a facts-and-circumstances approach to qualification. 10'
This process enables independent investigation and assures that disclo-
sure of the effects of objectionable terms is made.'02 The limited offer-
ing procedure appears to be an attempt to balance the need for investor
protection with the need for small business capital formation. Three
aspects of the limited offering qualification procedure, however, ham-
per its usefulness to small, corporate issuers. First, the transfer restric-
tions imposed by the Department on a limited offering make the
securities less valuable in relation to unrestricted securities of otherwise
similar quality. 10 3 Second, limiting speculative business to a closed
group of investors restricts the entrepreneur's access to the capital mar-
ket.104 Third, the uncertainty of what constitutes a showing of sophisti-
cation makes compliance with the requirements of a limited offering
difficult. 10 5
The entrepreneur who is dissatisfied with both open and limited of-
fering qualification requirements may still attempt to exempt the secur-
ity from qualification. The following section will briefly analyze some
current exemptions applicable to small corporations and will demon-
strate the need for reform addressed by the legislature in adopting a
new small offering exemption.
C Registration Exemptions
Because an offer or sale of any security in California must either be
qualified or exempted, an exemption applicable to both offers and sales
of securities enables the offeror to avoid the qualification process.106
The institutional investor 07 and the ten-or-fewer-shareholders "I ex-
emptions apply to offers and sales, while the nonpublic offering exemp-
tion applies only to offers. 109
. Institutional Investor Exemption
Any offer or sale of a security is exempt from issuer qualification if
made to certain institutional investors" 0 or to any company registered
101. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §6.05[3][c].
102. See notes 96-100 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 76 supra.
104. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
106. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25110.
107. Id §25102(i).
108. Id §25102(h).
109. Id §25102(a). The burden of proving that any of the three exemptions apply to a partic-
ular offer or sale is on the person claiming an exemption. Id §25163.
110. Institutional investors include entities such as banks, savings and loans, investment com-
panies, and certain college endowment funds. 10 CAL. ADMIT. CODE §260.102.10; CAL. CoaP.
CODE §25102(i).
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under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and such investor "repre-
sents that it is purchasing for its own account. for investment and
not with a view to or for sale in connection with any distribution of the
security."'11 This exemption presupposes that the knowledge and eco-
nomic bargaining power of these offerees eliminates the need for de-
partmental review."'
The institutional investor exemption is beneficial because the offeror
can structure the terms of the offer in any manner acceptable to the
offeree.I13 This exemption is of little aid to the small corporate issuer,
however, because institutional investors are generally unwilling to in-
vest in small business. 14 Thus, the small issuer must look for exemp-
tions that apply to sales to individuals.
2 Ten-or-Fewer-Shareholders Exemption
Another exemption available to the small corporate issuer is the ten-
or-fewer-shareholder exemption. This exemption applies to offers and
sales of voting common stock to be beneficially owned by no more than
ten persons." 5 The protective features of this exemption are designed
to exempt only those securities transactions in which the qualification
requirements are considered unnecessary. 1 6 Consequently, the ten-or-
fewer-shareholders exemption is narrow in application. A detailed
analysis of this protective, yet restrictive exemption is beyond the scope
of this comment. A brief highlighting of some of these restrictive pro-
visions, however, reveals the need for a more useful exemption.
First, the ten-or-fewer-shareholders exemption applies only to secur-
ities issuances taking place upon the initial organization' '7 of the is-
suer.1" The only exceptions to this rule are sales to institutional
investors' 19 and sales to existing shareholders for cash when unani-
mously approved by all shareholders.' 20 This rule and its exceptions
are designed to prevent majority shareholders from issuing stock to
themselves at an unfairly low price or from attempting to freeze out
minority shareholders by excluding them from a subsequent stock issu-
111. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(i).
112. This is the rationale for the comparable accredited investor exemption under Rule 146 of
the federal securities law. See note to 17 C.F.R. §239.146(e) (1980).
113. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h).
114. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
115. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h).
116. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §4.02[1].
117. "Initial organization" means the first issuance of stock after incorporation of a business.
MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §4.02[101[d].
118. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h)(3)(i), (ii).
119. Id §25102(i).
120. Id §25102(h)(3)(iii).
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ance in which only the majority participates.1 21 Nonetheless, if shares
are issued to additional individual investors after the initial organiza-
tion, the exemption is lost and qualification must be obtained, even
when the total number of shareholders remains at ten-or-fewer.
Second, if non-cash property is the consideration for the stock, the
property must be assets of an existing business enterprise in operation
for at least one year and the owners of the enterprise must be issued
stock in proportion to their interest in that enterprise. 122 Consequently,
the ten-or-fewer-shareholders exemption is unavailable to the promoter
who wants to contribute business assets and obtain additional cash by
issuing securities to other investors.
Third, control can only be retained through the purchase of a con-
trolling amount of common stock issued in consideration for cash or
cancellation of indebtedness. 23 This method for retaining control is
the sole method available under the exemption when securities are is-
sued to others. 124 The absence of alternatives arises in part because the
only allowable consideration (with the exception of business assets) is
cash or cancellation of indebtedness for money borrowed or both.125 In
addition, all stock issued must be voting common stock, 126 and there
may be only one class of stock outstanding. 27 Thus, the promoter de"
siring outside financing through issuance of securities must provide a
majority of the money to receive a majority vote.
Finally, the ten-or-fewer-shareholders exemption requires that a leg-
end 28 restricting transfer be placed on all shares issued pursuant to the
exemption.' 29 Because liquidity is a major concern of many securities
investors, this restriction makes the stock less marketable and less
valuable. 130
The ten-or-fewer-shareholders exemption fails to provide any assur-
ance that the proposed plan of business is practicable, that the manage-
121. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §4.02[10][c].
122. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h)(4).
123. Id §25102(h)(3)(i).
124. Id
125. Id §25102(h)(3)(ii). The use of promotional consideration is expressly disallowed under
the exemption. Id §25102(h)(4).
126. Id §25102(h).
127. Id A second class of stock is created if, at the time the shares are issued, there exists or is
presently intended to be executed a shareholders agreement pursuant to which any of the rights,
preferences, or privileges of any shares are modified. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.102.4(b); Ber-
ger, Statutory Close or Closely Held Corporation? 11 PAc. L.J. 699, 708-09.
128. A legend is a standard paragraph placed on shares that have transfer restriction imposed
under the CSL. See 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.141.1. While California Corporations Code
Section 25102(h) specifically refers to a legend requirement, the Commissioner is empowered
under §26141 to require legends or even the deposit of the securities in escrow to prevent transfer.
129. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h)(1).
130. See note 76 supra.
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ment is honest, competent, or experienced, that the plan of financing
will result in adequate capitalization, or that the material facts sur-
rounding the offering will be disclosed to the offerees.131 Unlike the
qualification requirements, the ten-or-fewer-shareholders exemption
imposes no duty to disclose financial information to the Department. 132
These gaps in investor protection arise because this exemption fails to
require disclosure by the issuer and to limit the exemption to offerees
who are able to make an informed evaluation. 13 3 Empirical evidence
suggests that many issuers using this exemption fail to maintain accu-
rate and complete financial information.134 Deficiency in financial re-
porting not only makes later attempts at qualification more difficult, 3-
but prevents investors from making an informed investment deci-
sion. 136 Without sufficient financial information, 137 investors cannot
substitute their own inquiries regarding the offering for those made by
the Department during the qualification process.' 38
Thus, the restrictive provisions of the ten-or-fewer-shareholders ex-
emption make this exemption unacceptable for many small corporate
issuers. The exemption also fails to provide protective features, such as
disclosure, as a substitute for certain departmental inquiries.
3. Nonpublic Offers and Agreements
The nonpublic offers and agreements exemption exempts only the
offer, not the sale, of securities.139  The actual sale must either fall
within another exemption or be qualified with the Department. 40 The
small corporate issuer, therefore, is still left with a choice between qual-
ification, the institutional investor exemption, or the ten-or-fewer-
shareholders exemption.
While the small corporate issuer is given a choice between several
methods of conforming an issuance to the requirements of the CSL, for
many of these issuers, the only real alternative is the limited offering
qualification. 14 1 This Hobson's Choice 42 partially arises because open
131. Compare notes 15-17, 23 and accompanying text supra.
132. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h).
133. See id
134. Survey results indicated that of the seven issuers whose initial issuance was made pursu-
ant to Section 25102(h) and who later sought to qualify an issuance, five issuers had their qualifi-
cation applications objected to because of inaccurate or incomplete financial information.
135. See note 134 supra.
136. Inaccurate or incomplete financial data is clearly misleading for persons who rely on this
data for investment decisions. See note 172 infra.
137. Applications for permit qualification require the issuer to provide reports of financial
condition. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.113, Item 22.
138. See notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
139. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(a).
140. See id §§25102(a), 25110.
141. Survey results show that out of the 14 small businesses studied, five initially applied for a
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qualification requirements dissuade those promoters who desire to re-
tain control of their business without use of personal funds alone, to
issue securities for a speculative business venture, or to be permitted a
variable standard of fairness.'43 The institutional investor exemption is
also useless for many small issuers because these investors rarely invest
in small business.'" Finally, the ten-or-fewer-shareholders exemption,
because of its protective, yet restrictive provisions, does not exempt
many types of securities issuances sought by small corporate issuers.'4 5
Thus, small corporations are left with the limited offering qualification.
This exemption, although frequently used by small issuers, inhibits
capital formation because of the requirement of transfer restrictions,
limitations on the type of offeree, and the uncertainty of what consti-
tutes a showing of sophistication. 146
The California Legislature, through the adoption of a new exemp-
tion, 47 provides the small corporate issuer with another possible ex-
emption. Although this exemption favors capital formation of small
business, its ability to safeguard adequately the interests of investors is
questionable.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO CALL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION
ENHANCEMENT: AMENDED SECTION 25102(f)
The California Legislature amended Section 25102(f) of the Califor-
nia Corporations Code to provide an exemption applicable to any se-
curity. 148 Offers and sales of any security are exempt if offered in a
limited offering qualification, and five more applied for a limited offering qualification after ini-
tially claiming a Section 25102(h) exemption. See Applications, supra note 58, at -.
142. This predicament is named after Thomas Hobson, an English liveryman, for his practice
of requiring every customer to take the horse which stood nearest the door and indicates an appar-
ent freedom of choice where there is no real alternative.
143. See notes 39-70 and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 115-131 and accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 71-85, 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
147. California Corporations Code Section 25102(f) was amended by the legislature in 1981.
This section previously exempted only nonpublic partnership or joint venture interests. CAL.
STATS. 1974, c. 1103, §4, at 2357. This amendment leaves unaffected all-qualification procedures
and exemptions previously discussed. If an issuer does not fall within this new exemption, any of
these qualification procedures and exemptions may apply to the offering.
148. Amended Section 25102(f), in pertinent part, reads:
Any offer or sale of any security in a transaction (other than an offer or sale to a
pension or profit-sharing trust of the issuer) which meets each of the following criteria:
(1) Sales of the security are not made to more than 35 persons, including persons not
in this state.
(2) All purchasers either have a preexisting personal or business relationship with the
offeror or any of its partners, officers, directors or controlling persons, or by reason of
their business or financial experience or the business or financial experience of their pro-
fessional advisors who are affiliated with and who are not compensated by the issuer or
any affiliate or selling agent of the issuer, directly or indirectly, could be reasonably
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transaction to no more than 35 offerees. 149 These offerees must:
either have a preexisting personal or business relationship with the
offeror or any of its partners, officers, directors, or controlling per-
sons, or by reason of their business or financial experience. . . could
be reasonably assumed to have the capacity to protect their own in-
terests in connection with the transaction.' 50
This latter sophistication test is also satisfied when offerees rely on:
the business or financial experience of their professional advisors
who are unaffiliated with and not compensated by the issuer or any
affiliate or selling agent of the issuer, directly or indirectly' 51 ...
Amended section 25102(f) enhances capital formation by making
available a new and useful exemption to the small, corporate issuer.'52
This exemption, like the institutional investor exemption, would allow
the offeror freedom to structure the terms of the offer in any manner
acceptable to qualified offerees.153
Such freedom, however, leaves the risk of investment in securities
unregulated. Any type of security offered at any price to finance any
business venture could be issued to qualified purchasers.' 5 4 Selling ex-
penses could be incurred in any amount, and promotional shares could
be issued in any amount.'55 Further, the plan of financing is not re-
quired to result in adequate capitalization. 56 Consequently, the bur-
assumed to have the capacity to protect their own interests in connection with the trans-
action.
(3) Each purchaser represents that the purchaser is purchasing for the purchaser's
own account (or a trust account if thepurchaser is a trustee) and not with a view to or for
sale in connection with any distribution of the security.
(4) The offer and sale of the security is not accomplished by the publication of any
advertisement. The number of purchasers referred to above is exclusive of any described
in subdivision (i), any officer, director or affiliate of the issuer and any other purchaser
who the commissioner designates by rule. For purposes of this section, a husband and
wife (together with any custodian or trustee acting for the account of their minor chil-
dren) are counted as one person and a partnership, corporation or other organization
which was not specifically formed for the purpose of purchasing the security offered in
reliance upon this exemption, is counted as one person. The commissioner may by rule
require the issuer to file a notice of transactions under this subdivision; provided, how-
ever, that the failure to file the notice or the failure to file the notice within the time
specified by the rule of the commissioner shall not affect the availability of this exemp-
tion. An issuer who fails to file the notice as provided by rule of the commissioner shall,
within 15 business days after demand by the commissioner, file the notice and pay to the
commissioner a fee equal to the fee payable had the transaction been qualified under
Section 25110.
149. CAL. COP,. CODE §25102(f)(1).
150. Id §25102(0(2).
151. Id
152. Out of 14 businesses reviewed, 13 had offerings that appeared to qualify for the present
exemption.
153. Besides limiting the type of investor and proscribing the use of advertising and purchases
with a view to sale, the terms of an offering issued under this exemption can be virtually unlim-
ited. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(0.
154. See id
155. See id; cf id §25102(h).
156. SeeId §25102().
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den of investigation into the merits of the investment falls squarely on
the investors or their advisors. For investors to be adequately pro-
tected, they must have the ability to make the same inquiries into the
merits of a securities investment that are made by the Department. 57
These inquiries require access to information concerning the invest-
ment.'58 An analysis of relevant portions of the exemption will show
that merely limiting its coverage to designated classes of purchasers is
an insufficient substitute for Departmental inquiry.
A. Capacity to Protect One's Own Interests
Amended section 25102(f) exempts offers and sales of any security to
those who "by reason of their business or financial experience...
could be reasonably assumed to have the capacity to protect their own
interests in connection with the transaction."'' 5 9 This standard requires
the issuer to make a subjective determination about the sophistication
of each offeree.' 6° If sophistication is later found not to exist, the ex-
emption is lost, and any purchaser dissatisfied with the investment may
bring suit for recission or damages. 16 1
Offeree sophistication, however, is not always required. Under the
statute, the acumen of an independent professional advisor may be
substituted for the sophistication of the investor. 162 This provision for
offeree representation is apparently a response to the requests of offer-
ors and their legal counsel that professional advice be determinative of
sophistication. 63 Nevertheless, the represented offeree needs access to
material facts.
Sophistication itself does not establish a relationship that enables ac-
cess to information concerning the issuer.164 While the new exemption
does not require disclosure to the Department or to investors and their
157. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
158. The forms required from the issuer by the Department are contained in Title 10 of the
California Administrative Code Sections 260.110-260.113.
159. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(f)(2).
160. See 46 Fed. Reg. 2633, 894 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1, 12-14 (Jan. 12, 1981) (discussion
of comparable provisions contained in Rule 146).
161. CAL. CORP. CODE §25503. These actions must be brought within two years of the viola-
tion or one year after discovery, whichever occurs first. Id §25507.
162. Section 25102(f) exempts from qualification offers and sales of any security to purchasers
who:
by reason of. . .the business and financial experience of their professional advisors who
are unaffiliated with and who are not compensated by the issuer or any affiliate...
could be reasonably assumed to have the capacity to protect their own interests in con-
nection with the transaction.
Id §25102(f)(2).
163. See Rhodes & Garwin, People v. Park" The Federalization of California's Unrepresented
Offerees, 6 ORANGE CouNTY BAR J. 178, 181 (1979).
164. Compare note 181 and accompanying text infra.
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representatives,165 some disclosure may be prerequisite to a finding of
sophistication or capacity to protect one's own interest.
The 1978 California Court of Appeal case of People v. Park demon-
strates that capacity to protect one's own interest depends on the availa-
bility of sufficient, accurate information.16 6  In Park, two women
invested $20,000 each 167 in a condominium project that was never
built.' 68 The money was misappropriated by the offeror. 169 Although
these women had occasional meetings with the offeror prior to the
transaction, the record was devoid of any showing of sophistication or
that the issuer made available to these investors the information neces-
sary to an intelligent investment decision.170
Sophistication under federal law requires access to material informa-
tion.17' Information is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable person would consider it important in deciding whether to
invest."'172 This judicially-recognized need for information available to
the investor is left unaddressed by the exemption. Until material infor-
mation is made available by the offeror, the business or financial expe-
rience of the purchaser or the purchaser's professional advisor does not
guarantee the ability to protect the purchaser's interests.' 73 Before an
investor can adequately assess the consequences of a securities invest-
ment, all material information about the issuer and the terms of the
issuance is needed by the investor. 174
B. Preexisting Personal or Business Relationship
The exemption applies to purchasers with a "preexisting personal or
business relationship with the offeror or any of its partners, officers,
directors, or controlling persons 75 . . ." The few cases that have con-
strued the meaning of preexisting personal or business relationship
simply rearticulate this condition by holding it inapplicable when the
offerees and the issuer are "relative strangers."'' 76 This condition, how-
165. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(0.
166. 87 Cal. App. 3d 550, 565, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (1978).
167. Id at 557, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
168. Id at 560, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
169. Id
170. Id at 565, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
171. Securities and Exch. Comm. v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 643 (9th Cir. 1980).
172. Id
173. "Just as a scientist cannot be without his specimens, so the shrewdest investor's acuity
will be blunted without specifications about the issuer." Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp.,
545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977).
174. Id
175. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(0(2).
176. People v. Skelton, 109 Cal. App. 3d 691, 725, 167 Cal. Rptr. 636, 654 (1980); People v.
Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 698, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1970) (mobile home park owners
purchased securities from mobile home park owner through his agents).
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ever, appears to embrace relatives, employees, personal friends, or per-
sons having a continuous business relationship with the offeror.177
The purpose of exempting offers and sales between persons having a
preexisting personal or business relationship is to differentiate public
offerings from privately, negotiated securities transactions. 178 While it
is plausible that a friend, relative, or business associate can make an
informed judgment on the offeror's honesty, it is questionable if that
friend, relative, or business associate will actually negotiate the terms of
the offer.
179
Persons having a preexisting personal or business relationship are
not assured disclosure of, or access to, material information under the
express terms of the statute. 80 Implicit in this kind of statutory exemp-
tion is the belief that "employment or family [or other personal or busi-
ness] relationship. . . enables the offeree to obtain information from
this issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective
investment."'' Possession of material information is a prerequisite to
the effective negotiation of the terms of the offer.182 That offerees hav-
ing a preexisting relationship to the offeror actually obtain this infor-
mation is conjecture.' 8 3 Small business entrepreneurs are reluctant to
share information concerning their business with others.'8 4 Thus, ab-
sent a legal obligation mandating disclosure, it is unlikely that many
investors will receive all material information about the issuance or the
issuer's business.
C. Hiatus in Statutory Disclosure Obligations
When an offering is exempt under the new exemption to the CSL,
disclosure of information concerning the offering and the issuer is not
required to be made to the Department or to the offerees.185 If an offer-
ing is exempt from registration under Section 5 of the Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (hereinafter referred to as 1933 Act), disclosure is often
177. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §4.05[2].
178. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 12, §4.05[2].
179. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
180. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(f).
181. Note to 17 C.F.R. §230.146(e) (1980).
182. See notes 173, 174 and accompanying text supra.
183. For example, an employee who is offered the "opportunity" to invest in his employer's
business is not likely to demand a current set of financial statements before investing.
184. Small business entrepreneurs ... wish to maintain the confidentiality of their
financial positions and operating results. They do not wish to have others tell them how
to operate their businesses, even though occasionally they may need outside counsel.
They often view outside shareholders as a threat to their freedom of action.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 795 (statement of William C. Penick on behalf of the National Small
Business Association).
185. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(f).
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not required under federal law.18 6 If an offering falls within both a
federal exemption not requiring disclosure and the new exemption to
the CSL, then there is no regulatory disclosure obligation for the bene-
fit of the offerees.
Qualification of securities under the CSL requires the issuer to make
substantial disclosures to the Department concerning the issuer, the is-
suer's business, and the terms of the offering.I8 7 Similarly, Section 5 of
the 1933 Act requires the issuer to make an extensive disclosure of in-
formation in a registration statement.188 Just as the CSL has exemp-
tions to qualification, the 1933 Act has exemptions to registration.
The exemptions to the registration provision of the 1933 Act, for pur-
poses of this discussion, are of two types: exemptions that require dis-
closure of information'8 9 and those that do not require such
disclosure. 190 Most prominent among the exemptions not requiring
disclosure is the Rule 147 intrastate offering exemption which was
adopted pursuant to Section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act.' 91 Essentially,
Rule 147 exempts the offer and sale of securities to persons residing
within a single state or territory offered by an issuer doing business
within the state or territory. 192 Securities sold under this exemption
may be resold to persons residing within the state, and after nine
months from original issuance, to persons, residing out of state.' 93 No
disclosure is required under the 1933 Act when securities fall within the
Rule 147 exemption. 194
When an offering falls within the Section 25102(f) exemption, disclo-
sure is not required under the qualification procedures of the CSL.195
If the offering also falls within a federal exemption from registration,
such as Rule 147, no disclosure is required under the 1933 Act registra-
tion provisions.' 96 The only statutory disclosure obligations that the
offering is subject to are the state and federal anti-fraud laws. ' 97 These
anti-fraud provisions make it unlawful for the issuer to make any mis-
representations or material omissions of fact to the offerees in connec-
tion with the offering.' 98 These provisions are remedial, 199 however,
186. See 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1981).
187. See 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §260.113.
188. 15 U.S.C. §77e (1976).
189. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§230.251-230.264 (Regulation A); 230.242 (Rule 242); §230.146
(Rule 146); 239.29 (Form S-18) (1981).





195. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(0.
196. See 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1981).
197. See 15 U.S.C. §§77j, 77q (1976); CAL. CoiP. CODE §25401.
198. See 15 U.S.C. §§77j, 7 7 q (1976); CAL. CORP. CODE §25401.
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and recovery by the offeree in the event of investment loss is not as-
sured.2°° The uncertainty of this after-the-fact recovery indicates the
need to fill the gap in disclosure which the federal and the new state
exemptions, collectively, create.
Although the new state exemption is limited to purchasers having
sophistication or a preexisting personal or business relationship with
the offeror or any of its partners, officers, directors, or controlling per-
sons, even these purchasers must be given the opportunity to make in-
formed investment decisions.0 1 Persons having a preexisting personal
or business relationship may be able to judge the offeror's character
and may be in a position that permits access to information.20 2
Whether these offerees will actually take advantage of their relation-
ship with the offeror to obtain the necessary information and negotiate
the terms of the offering, however, is uncertain.20 3 Persons having busi-
ness or financial experience should understand the consequences of in-
vesting in a particular offering. Until these investors are given
information necessary to an investment decision, however, they cannot
accurately assess the consequences of investing in the security.2°4
Mandatory information disclosure by the offeror to the offerees gives
the investor this opportunity. Absent a disclosure requirement,
amended section 25102(f) inadequately safeguards investors' need for
information.
PROPOSAL
The addition of a disclosure requirement to section 25102(f) would
provide investors with pre-investment information and coerce adequate
issuer financial record-keeping by requiring financial statements as part
of this information disclosure. A disclosure requirement is needed
under section 25102(f) to help prevent the inadequate maintenance of
financial data that is prevalent among issuers falling under the ten-or-
fewer-shareholders exemption. This provision should include the filing
of a disclosure document along with delivery of an offering circular to
the offeree prior to receipt of consideration or issuance of shares.
Investor protection is furthered when information is not only accessi-
ble, but is delivered to the securities offeree via an offering circular filed
with a regulatory agency. This disclosure scheme, which should apply
199. See 15 U.S.C. §§77j, 77q (1976); CAL. CORP. CODE §25401.
200. Even if the plaintiff-offeree obtains a verdict against the issuer, satisfaction of the judg-
ment may be impossible since proceeds of the issuance will most likely have been expended.
201. See notes 173-174 and accompanying text supra.
202. See notes 179-183 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 179-183 and accompanying text supra.
204. See notes 173-174 and accompanying text supra.
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to the new exemption from qualification, should make specific provi-
sions for the contents of the disclosure documents, filing and diclosure
procedures, and exemptions from the required information disclosure.
The major contents of this information disclosure should be the in-
formation required under Form 1-A of the 1933 Act.2"5 This form was
adopted pursuant to Regulation A of the 1933 Act,20 6 and was designed
to abate the regulatory burdens that federal securities laws place on
small issuers.2 0 7 Form 1-A should be filed with the Department regard-
less if the form has been, or will be, filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. If the information contained in Form 1-A
already has been reviewed by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, then the form could be filed with the Department without re-
view. 08 Otherwise, the Department would review the form for
accuracy and completeness. Rather than simply enumerating the pres-
ent requirements contained in Form 1-A, the proposed disclosure pro-
vision refers only to Form 1-A by name.20 9 This would allow
California disclosure requirements to vary with any changes in Form 1-
A. Consequently, a basis for coordination with federal law is estab-
lished, and issuers who are exempt under California law, but who are
simultaneously offering securities under a federal exemption requiring
Form I-A, will not have to duplicate effort.21° If the issuer is not re-
quired to file audited financial statements under federal law, the
financial statements may be unaudited under this proposal.2 ' In addi-
tion to the Form 1-A information, the use of promotional shares and
selling expenses should be noted by the issuer.
205. See [Securities Act-Forms] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7325-7327b (1981).
206. 17 C.F.R. §230.255(a) (1981).
207. 6 R. SHAPIRO, A. SACHS & C. OLANDER, SECURITIES REGULATION FoRMs CoMPLI-
ANCE-PRACTICE'§2.01 (1980).
208. In this manner, the Department could rely on the review made by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
209. A statutory disclosure provision should make only a general reference to disclosure. An
administrative code section should be employed to make the reference to Form I-A. Thus, if
Form I-A undergoes a change of name or is repealed altogether, the California provisions could
be modified by the Commissioner without the need for legislative action.
210. Under a proposed revision to the Regulation A filing requirements, the Form 1-A would
provide a "pool" of disclosure items. The applicability of any particular item would vary with the
type of business a given issuer is conducting. Securities Act Release No. 6275, 46 Fed. Reg. 2639,
894 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 35, 42-43 (Jan. 12, 1981).
211. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants provides for two reporting stan-
dards applicable to unaudited financial statements. These standards are called compilation and
review. Compilation of financial statements involves presenting information that is the represen-
tations of management without the independent accountant's expressing any assurance on the
statements. Review, on the other hand, involves the accountant's inquiry and analysis which pro-
vides a reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance that the statements conform with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles or, if applicable, with another comprehensive basis of
accounting. See STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, 12 THE REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 967-68 (Mar. 14, 1979). Unaudited financial statements should include an independent certi-
fied public accountant's review.
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The amount of promotional consideration, as defined by Commis-
sioner's Rule 260.140.30,212 and the names of the recipients should be
furnished. This amount includes the following: promotional consider-
ation given to date, promotional consideration associated with the pro-
posed offering, and a total of those amounts. Estimated selling
expenses213 to be incurred in the proposed offering also should be
listed. Finally, a total of estimated selling expenses and the amount of
promotional consideration associated with the proposed offering
should be set forth. This total should be expressed both in terms of
amount and as a percent of the aggregate offering price. Listing selling
expenses and promotional consideration in this manner allows the in-
vestor to make a quick assessment of the dilutive effect these terms
have on the investment. The procedure for disclosing material infor-
mation should include requirements that the information be filed with
the Department for possible review and later delivered to the offerees
for review.
After filing and review of the required information, the offeror
should then provide each offeree with an offering circular. This circu-
lar should contain a standardized letter of explanation by the Depart-
ment214 with an attached copy of the issuer's disclosure filing. As a
further precaution, each investor should be allowed time for analysis
after delivery of the offering circular. This time for "second thoughts"
could be provided by a refusal to give legal effect to any purchase
agreement entered into before a specified number of days after each
offeree receives a circular.
While this proposed disclosure scheme provides useful information
to the investor, it does encumber the issuer. Because it does so, the
requirement of providing information pursuant to the disclosure
scheme should exclude those situations in which the investor's partici-
pation in the venture guarantees access to material information. For
this reason, when the sole offerees are officers, directors, or controlling
persons of the issuer, the disclosure process may be waived.215 Such
212. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §240.140.30.
213. Selling expenses are defined in Title 10 of California Administrative Code Section
260.140.20. They include total underwriting and brokerage discounts and commissions as well as
all other expenses actually incurred in connection with the offering. They do not include account-
ants' or the issuer's attorney's fees, or options to underwriters. This letter of explanation should
include a statement that no fair, just, and equitable determination has been made with respect to
the securities offering, an admonishment that the investor should seek professional advice, and an
address and phone number at the Department where the investor can call for information.
214. This letter of explanation should include a statement that no fair, just, and equitable
determination has been made with respect to the securities, an admonishment that the investor
seek professional advice, and an address and phone number at the Department where the investor
can call for information.
215. Compare 17 C.F.R. Section 230.257 (1981) which exempts offerings that have an aggre-
gate offering price not in excess of $100,000 from the requirement of using an offering circular in
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offeree waiver should be unanimous and in writing.
The new section 25102(f) exemption, therefore, should be modified
to include a mandatory disclosure obligation. This disclosure should
contain the information required in Form 1-A of the 1933 Act as well
as information on promotional securities and selling expenses. After
filing this information with the Department, the issuer should provide
this information to the offerees via an offering circular. When the only
offerees are officers, directors, and controlling persons of the issuer, dis-
closure is unnecessary and may be waived. The goal of this disclosure
requirement is to provide information needed by the offerees to make
their own inquiries in lieu of the Department's fairness determinations.
CONCLUSION
A need exists to enhance capital formation of small corporations,
through reform of the CSL, without unduly sacrificing investor protec-
tion. Under current law, small corporate issuers are afforded several
options for conforming a securities issuance to the requirements of the
CSL. Open qualification of securities is either unacceptable or unavail-
able to many small corporate issuers. These issuers can find some relief
in the limited offering qualification, but the number of potential offer-
ees in a limited offering is restricted, and the risks of the offering are
still regulated. Further, the exemptions from qualification available to
small corporate issuers are so limited that many of these issuers must
turn to qualification.
The California Legislature has adopted an exemption that will be
useful to many small issuers. Securities offerings that would not fall
under current exemptions or easily qualify under the CSL may be ex-
empt under the exemption adopted by the legislature. These exempt
offerings will not carry the restrictions present under the current ex-
emptions or the qualification requirements. Removal of departmental
restrictions on the terms of an offering gives the offeror and offerees
more freedom to negotiate. This exemption, however, lacks sufficient
safeguards for investor protection. There is no assurance that offerees
will be furnished the information needed to conduct the type of inquir-
ies that the Department makes in determining whether a securities of-
fering is fair, just, and equitable. Sophistication alone does not
guarantee the offeree access to information. While preexisting personal
or business relationships may allow investors to gain insight into the
connection with Regulation A filings. Provision for waiver of the disclosure requirement based on
dollar amount is rejected under this proposal. The dollar amount of the offering alone bears no
rational relation to the need for material information concerning a securities investment.
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offeror's character, a relative, friend, or business associate will not
likely demand or be given access to material facts surrounding the
offering.
This comment has proposed that the exemption adopted by the legis-
lature contain an information disclosure obligation. By exempting a
security from qualification and substituting disclosure for departmental
inquiry, the offerees are provided a basis for negotiation. Receipt of
material information by the offerees affords them the opportunity to
make intelligent investment decisions through substitution of their in-
quiries into the issuance for those of the Department.
The new exemption should be modified to include a mandatory dis-
closure obligation. This disclosure should contain the information re-
quired in Form 1-A of the 1933 Act as well as information on
promotional securities and selling expenses. After filing this informa-
tion with the Department, the issuer should provide this information to
the offerees via an offering circular. When the only offerees are officers,
directors, and controlling persons of the issuer, disclosure is unneces-
sary and may be waived. Removal of regulation of the risks associated
with a securities investment enhances capital formation by allowing en-
trepreneurs the freedom to structure the terms of outside financing.
Disclosure to investors is needed, however, for an informed assessment
of the risks those investors are willing to accept.
William J Ward
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